Option values of low carbon technology policies by Finon, Dominique & Meunier,  Guy
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Option values of low carbon technology policies: how to 
combine irreversibility effects and learning-by-doing in 
decisions 
 
 
Dominique Finon and Guy Meunier 
 
June 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
CWPE 1231 & EPRG 1215 
 
 
 
  
www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk 
E
P
R
G
 W
O
R
K
IN
G
 P
A
P
E
R
 
Abstract 
Option values of low carbon technology policies: 
how to combine irreversibility effects and 
learning-by-doing in decisions 
EPRG Working Paper    1215 
Cambridge Working Paper in Economics  1231 
Dominique Finon and Guy Meunier  
 
In this paper, the political dilemma of the deployment of a large-size low 
carbon technology (LCT) is analyzed. A simple dynamic model is 
developped to analyze the interrelation between irreversible investments 
and learning-by-doing within a context of exogeneous uncertainty on 
carbon price. Contrasting results are obtained. In some cases, the usual 
irreversibility effects hold, fewer plants of the LCT should be developed 
when information is anticipated. In other cases, this result is reversed 
and information arrival can justify an early deployment of the LCT. More 
precisely, it is shown that marginal reasoning is limited when learning-
by-doing, and more generally endogenous technical change, is 
considered. When information arrival is anticipated the optimal policy 
can move from a corner optimum with no LCT deployment to an interior 
optimum with a strictly positive development. 
 
Keywords  investment, option value, learning-by-doing 
JEL Classification D83, O33, Q55 
Contact finon@centre-cired.fr   
Publication June 2012 
Financial Support       
EPRG	WP	1215	
1 
	
Option	value	of	low	carbon	technologies	policies:	
how	to	combine	irreversibility	effect	and	
learning‐by‐doing	in	decisions?	
	
	
Guy	MEUNIER1	
Ecole	Polytechnique	and	INRA—UR1303	ALISS	
	
Dominique	FINON		
CNRS—CIRED	
	
13	June	2012	
	
			
	In	this	paper,	the	political	dilemma	of	the	deployment	of	a	large‐size	low	carbon	
technology	(LCT)	is	analyzed.	A	simple	dynamic	model	is	developped	to	analyze	
the	interrelation	between	irreversible	investments	and	learning‐by‐doing	within	
a	 context	 of	 exogeneous	 uncertainty	 on	 carbon	 price.	 Contrasting	 results	 are	
obtained.	In	some	cases,	the	usual	irreversibility	effects	hold,	fewer	plants	of	the	
LCT	 should	 be	 developed	when	 information	 is	 anticipated.	 In	 other	 cases,	 this	
result	is	reversed	and	information	arrival	can	justify	an	early	deployment	of	the	
LCT.	 More	 precisely,	 it	 is	 shown	 that	 marginal	 reasoning	 is	 limited	 when	
learning‐by‐doing,	 and	 more	 generally	 endogenous	 technical	 change,	 is	
considered.	When	information	arrival	is	anticipated	the	optimal	policy	can	move	
from	a	corner	optimum	with	no	LCT	deployment	to	an	interior	optimum	with	a	
strictly	positive	development.		
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 1		Introduction	
	
Low	 carbon	 technologies	 (LCTs)	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 major	 option	 for	
reducing	 emissions	 from	 the	 electricity	 industry,	 which	 is	 the	 main	 emitting	
industrial	 sector.	 The	most	 promising	 options	 are:	 carbon	 capture	 and	 storage	
(CCS),	 the	 new	 nuclear,	 solar	 thermal	 plants,	 and	 offshore	 windpower	 farms.	
These	 technologies	 require	 high	 upfront	 capital	 investments	 and	 long	
construction	 lead‐times.	Such	new	 large‐size	 technologies	must	undergo	a	 long	
and	 risky	 transition	 stage	 before	 they	 become	 commercially	 available	 (Grubb	
and	Newbery,	2007).	 In	 the	chain	of	 innovations,	 these	 technologies	are	still	at	
the	stage	of	demonstration	or	early	commercialization,	and	important	``learning‐
by‐doing''	should	be	expected	from	first	investments.	These	investments	must	be	
performed	in	a	context	of	uncertainty	surrounding	the	carbon	price,	which	itself	
is	related	to	the	uncertainty	of	 future	climate	policies,	the	cost	of	adaptation	or	
scientific	 knowledge.	 Such	 uncertainty	 must	 be	 considered	 by	 a	 firm	 when	
deciding	 how	 much	 to	 invest	 in	 LCT	 equipment.	 Similarly,	 governments	 must	
consider	uncertainty	surrounding	any	future	international	climate	regime	when	
creating	 policies	 to	 support	 the	 deployment	 of	 LCTs.	 The	 public	 support	 to	 an	
LCT	 is	 justified	 by	 learning‐by‐doing	 and	 more	 generally	 by	 endogenous	
technical	change,	if	there	are	spill	overs	from	one	firm	to	another	(Arrow,	1962).	
	
	 In	 the	 present	 article,	 an	 analytical	 model	 of	 a	 regulator’s	 sequential	
choice	 of	 LCT	 plants	 in	 the	 context	 of	 uncertainty	 of	 the	 carbon	 price	 is	
developped.	 There	 are	 two	 periods	 and	 two	 technologies	 a	 LCT	 and	 a	 carbon	
technology.	In	the	first	period,	the	regulator	chooses		a	particular	number	of	LCT	
plants.	In	this	period,	because	the	LCT	is	more	costly	than	the	carbon	technology,	
there	 is	an	opportunity	cost	 to	 invest	 in	 the	LCT;	however,	due	 to	 learning‐by‐
doing,	 these	first	period	investments	reduce	the	costs	of	future	LCT	plants.	The	
uncertainty	of	the	carbon	price	translates	into	an	uncertainty	regarding	the	cost	
of	the	carbon	technology.	The	influence	of	learning,	which	is	in	fact	a	process	of	
acquiring	information	in	the	second	period	on	the	development	of	the	LCT	in	the	
first	 period,	 is	 investigated.	 Two	 optimal	 investments	 in	 the	 LCT	 capacity	 are	
compared.	These	two	investments	minimize	the	aggregate	expected	costs	in	two	
scenarios,	with	and	without	learning	of	the	true	CO2	price	in	the	second	period.	
In	 both	 scenarios,	 in	 the	 first	 period,	 the	 regulator	has	 an	 a	 priori	 uncertainty	
regarding	the	carbon	price.	In	the	“uninformed”	scenario,	the	regulator	has	still	
no	 information	 in	 the	 second	 period;	 in	 the	 “informed”	 scenario,	 the	 regulator	
learns	the	true	carbon	price	in	the	second	period.	The	 	change	from	the	first	to	
the	 second	scenario	 is	 interpreted	as	an	 increase	 in	 information.	The	objective	
function,	 the	 aggregated	 expected	 cost,	 is	 not	 convex	 because	 of	 learning‐by‐
doing:	the	initial	investment	in	a	LCT	constitutes	a	pure	loss	until	the	technology	
becomes	competitive,	it	is	only	once	this	competitivity	threshold	is	reached	that	
a	marginal	(first‐period)	investment	could	reduce	aggregate	expected	costs.	This	
non‐convexity	plays	a	key	role	in	the	result.	
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	 It	 is	 shown	 that,	 if	 the	 expected	 price	 of	 CO2	 is	 high,	 the	 standard	
irreversibility	effect	holds:	 there	should	be	 less	 investment	 in	LCT	plants	when	
information	will	 be	 available	 than	 in	 an	 uninformed	 scenario.	 However,	 if	 the	
expected	 price	 of	 CO2	 is	 low	 and	 uncertainty	 is	 sufficiently	 high,	 larger	
investment	in	the	LCT	occurs	when	information	will	be	available.	More	precisely,	
the	LCT	 is	not	developed	 in	 the	uninformed	scenario,	whereas	 in	 the	 informed	
scenario,	 a	 strictly	 positive	 quantity	 of	 plants	 is	 developed.	 This	 stresses	 the	
distinction	of	the	two	decisions:	whether	or	not	to	launch	an	LCT	policy,	and	its	
size.	 It	 is	 established	 that,	 with	 information	 acquisition,	 LCT	 policy	 should	 be	
launched	earlier	and,	if	launched,	it	should	be	smaller.		
	
The	present		approach	is	in	the	tradition	of	the	option	value	literature	that	
analyzes	 how	 irreversible	 decisions	 are	 influenced	 by	 uncertainty	 and	
information	 acquisition.	 Initiated	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 environmental	
preservation,	the	standard	irreversibility	effect	(Henry,	1974;	Arrow	and	Fisher,	
1974)	 explains	 that	 the	prospect	of	 obtaining	 information	 in	 the	 future	 should	
limit	 today's	 irreversible	 actions.	 Applied	 to	 analyzing	 firms'	 investment	
decision,	 the	 notion	 of	 option	 value	 emphasizes	 the	 idea	 that	 investing	 today	
eliminates	the	option	to	 invest	 later	and	explains	that	 investments	are	reduced	
by	the	prospect	 to	obtain	 information	(Bernanke,	1983;	Pyndick,	1988;	Dixit	et	
Pyndick,	 1994).	 However,	 it	 is	 now	 well‐known	 that	 the	 sign	 of	 the	 effect	 of	
uncertainty	(Rothshild	and	Stiglitz,	1971)	and	 information	acquisition	(Epstein,	
1980)	on	investments	is	ambiguous	even	in	a	simple	model	(Salanié	and	Treich,	
2009).		
	
Concerning	the	mitigation	of	CO2	emissions,	there	is	a	vast	litterature	that	
analyzes	whether	uncertainty	and	learning	can	justify	an	increase	or	a	reduction	
of	today’s	abatment.	It	has	been	shown	that	not	only	emissions	irreversibility	but	
also	 their	accumulation	determines	 the	sign	of	 the	effect	of	 learning	on	today’s	
emission;	 and	 Ulph	 and	 Ulph	 (1997)	 show	 that	 the	 effect	 of	 emissions	
accumulation	counteracts	the	effect	of	emissions	irreversibility.	They	establish	in	
a	 quadratic	 framework,	 that	 learning	 reduces	 today’s	 effort	 if	 the	 emissions	
constraint	is	never	binding	(see	also	Karp	and	Zhang,	2006).	Gollier	et	al.	(2000)	
provide	 an	 analytical	 analysis	 of	 the	 interactions	 between	 accumulation	 and	
irreversibility	of	pollutant	emissions	(see	also	Lange	and	Treich,	2008).	Kolstad	
(1996)	 considers	 the	 tension	 between	 two	 irreversibility	 constraints:	 the	
irreversibility	 of	 today's	 emissions	 and	 the	 irreversibility	 of	 clean	 capital	
investment.	Kolstad	(1996)	concludes	that	the	latter	is	more	likely	to	be	binding;	
thus,	 information	acquisition	 implies	that	 less	 investment	should	be	committed	
in	 clean	 capital,	 but	 this	 neglects	 the	 existence	 of	 learning‐by‐doing,	 which	 is	
often	 mentioned	 as	 the	 main	 rationale	 of	 current	 policies	 toward	 LCTs.	 The		
effect	of	learning	on	abatement	policy	has	also	been	investigated	with	numerical	
simulations,	the	results	of	which	are	contrasted	(Keller	et	al.,	2004).	In	particular	
the	work	of	Ha	Duong	et	al.	(1997)	emphasizes	the	role	of	socioeconomic	inertia	
on	the	optimal	path	under	uncertainty.	They	show	that,	with	inertia,		uncertainty	
justifies	to	increase	effort	in	2020.		The	time	required	for	the	process	of	learning‐
by‐doing	is	a	form	of	inertia.		
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In	 the	 present	 article,	 accumulation	 and	 irreversibility	 of	 emissions	 are	
not	 considered	 in	 order	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 specific	 role	 of	 learning‐by‐doing.	
Investments	in	a	new	technology	motivated	by	the	learning‐by‐doing	benefit	are	
quite	similar	to	 investments	 in	R&D	intended	to	reduce	the	cost	of	an	LCT.	The	
influence	of	uncertainty	surrounding	the	carbon	price	on	R&D	spending	has	been	
previously	analyzed	by	Larson	and	Frisvold	(1996)	and	Baker	and	Shittu	(2006),	
and	the	effect	of	information	acquisition	on	the	binary	decision	to	launch	or	not	
launch	an	R&D	effort	on	LCTs	has	been	analyzed	by	Schimmelpfenning	(1995).	
These	authors	obtained	contrasting	results.	On	one	hand,	the	application	of	the	
result	of	Baker	and	Shittu	(2006,	proposition	3	pp	170)	to	our	issue	of	learning	
investments	leads	to	the	conclusion	that	information	acquisition	should	result	in	
decreased	investments.	On	the	other	hand,	Schimmelpfenning	(1995)	concludes	
that	 the	 presence	 of	 uncertainty	 on	 the	 carbon	 price	 increases	 the	 value	 of	 an	
R&D	 project.	 The	 present	 analysis	 creates	 a	 bridge	 between	 these	 two	
approaches.	Considering	the	two	aforementioned	studies,		contrasting	results	in	
the	 present	 article	 are	 obtained	 for	 two	 reasons:	 first	 while	 Baker	 and	 Shittu	
(2006)	 focus	 on	 interior	 equilibria	 and	 use	 marginal	 reasoning,	 the	 present	
analysis	highlights	 that	marginal	 reasoning	 is	not	 sufficient	because	of	 the	non	
convexity	specific	 to	R&D	and	 learning‐by‐doing	 investments,	 it	 is	necessary	 to	
consider	 	global	conditions;	second,	Schimmelpfenning	(1995)	only	considers	a	
binary	 choice	 and	 does	 not	 analyze	 how	 the	 size	 of	 the	 project	 is	 affected	 by	
uncertainty	when	the	project	is	launched.			
	
			 Both	 R&D	 and	 learning‐by‐doing	 are	 examples	 of	 endogenous	 technical	
change.	 In	 the	 debate	 on	 climate	 policy,	 endogenous	 technical	 change	 is	
recognized	as	a	key	element	to	assess	the	optimal	abatement	strategy,	and	it	has	
been	incorporated	in	numerical	models	devoted	to	the	analysis	of	climate	policy	
(see	Wing	et	al.,	2006,	for	a	review).	The	introduction	of	learning‐by‐doing	into	
such	 models	 increases	 model	 complexity	 and	 problematic	 non‐convexities.	
Manne	 and	 Barreto	 (2004)	 discuss	 the	 difficulties	 associated	 with	 these	 non‐
convexities;	they	emphasize	that	with	standard	algorithms	there	is	no	guarantee	
that	a	local	optimum	will	also	be	a	global	optimum.	This	issue	is	also	outlined	in	
the	 recent	work	of	Keller	 et	 al.	 (2004),	 and	Lorenz	et	 al.	 (2012)	on	 the	 role	of	
uncertainty	on	climate	threshold	damages.		
	
In	the	simple	model	developped	in	the	present	article	the	non‐convexity	is	
easily	handled,	and	 the	analysis	shows	how	 it	 interacts	with	 the	uncertainty	of	
climate	 policy.	 Furthermore,	 the	 results	 of	 numerical	 models	 are	 highly	
dependent	of	their	calibration.	Even	though	a	thorough	numerical	simulation	is	
not	done	here,	 it	 is	worth	mentioning	 the	difficulties	 to	estimate	 learning	rates	
and	 some	 associated	 issues	 that	 are	 relevant	 to	 interpret	 the	 results.	 For	
instance,	McDonald	 and	 Schrattenholzer	 (2001)	 survey	 estimations	 of	 learning	
rates	 in	 the	energy	sector	and	show,	 for	photovoltaics,	how	the	same	data	sets	
can	 generate	 a	 large	 range	 of	 estimations.	 The	 difficulty	 to	 get	 a	 persuasive	
estimation	of	a	 learning	curve	is	related	to	the	reduced	form	nature	of	 learning	
curves,	particularly	when	they	are	used	at	a	sectoral	level,	and	not,	as	initially,	at	
the	plant	or	firm	level	(Nemet,	2006).	The	empirical	observation	of	the	decrease	
of	 an	 output	 price	 with	 cumulative	 production	 could	 be	 explained	 by	 several	
mechanisms.	 It	 could	 be	 difficult	 to	 disentangle	 the	 specific	 role	 played	 by	
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learning‐by‐doing	 from	 the	 role	 of	 R&D,	 economies	 of	 scale	 and	 spillovers	 or	
even	 producers'	 pricing	 strategies	 (Sagar	 and	 Van	 der	 Zwaan,	 2006;	 Jamasb,	
2007).	 In	 the	present	work,	 it	 is	 simply	 assumed	 that	 the	 cost	 of	 an	LCT	plant	
decreases	with	cumulative	investment.		The	precise	mechanisms	underlying	this	
effect	 are	 not	 detailed;	 these	 mechanisms	 are	 important	 to	 accurately	 assess	
public	policies	 toward	LCTs,	because	 they	determine	the	need	for	such	policies	
and	their	optimal	design	(Jaffe	et	al.,	2005).	
	
The	 rest	 of	 the	 paper	 is	 organized	 as	 follows.	 In	 Section	 2,	 the	 model	 is	
introduced.	In	Section	3,	the	choices	of	LCT	investment	when	information	arrival	
is	 not	 anticipated	 (the	 uninformed	 scenario)	 	 when	 information	 is	 anticipated	
(the	 informed	 scenario)	 are	 compared.	 In	 Section	 4,	 the	 assumptions	 of	 the	
model	 are	 discussed,	 and	 a	 numerical	 illustration	 is	 provided.	 Section	 5	
concludes.	
	
 2		Model	
	
2.1		Framework	
	
There	are		two	time	periods	 1;2=t 	and	two	technologies	are	available	to	
produce	 a	 homogenous	 good.	 The	 first	 technology	 represents	 an	 LCT	whereas	
the	 second	 technology	 is	 conventional	 carbon	 technology.	 The	 aggregate	
quantity	 of	 plants	 that	 should	 be	 built	 is	 fixed.	 For	 the	 sake	 of	 simplification,	
existing	and	new	equipment	are	supposed	to	produce	at	 full	capacity	 to	satisfy	
the	demand	during	the	two	periods.	The	demand	to	supply	in	the	first	period	is	
1D 	and	the	demand	in	the	second	period	is	 21 DD  .	The	production	capacity	that	
should	 be	 installed	 in	 the	 first	 period	 is	 1D 	 and	 the	 production	 capacity	 that	
should	be	built	 in	 the	second	period	 is	 2D .	The	demand	is	assumed	inelastic	 in	
order	 to	 simplify	 the	 analytical	 model,	 this	 assumption	 is	 relaxed	 in	 the	
numerical	application	provided	in	Section	4.	The	cost	of	LCT	plants	is	subject	to	
learning‐by‐doing	 effects	 while	 there	 is	 uncertainty	 regarding	 the	 cost	 of	 the	
conventional	carbon	technology.	
	
In	the	first	period,	a	quantity	 x 	of	LCT	plants	is	chosen	and	the	remaining	
xD 1 	 plants	 belong	 to	 the	 conventional	 carbon	 technology.	 In	 the	 second	
period,	 the	 2D 	 additional	 plants	 are	 either	 LCT	 or	 conventional,	 depending	 on	
their	marginal	costs.	The	cheaper	technology	is	used	to	produce	all	plants.	
In	 the	 first	 period,	 the	 marginal	 cost	 of	 plants	 of	 both	 types	 is	 constant;	 the	
marginal	 cost	of	 the	LCT	 is	 1c ,	 and	 the	marginal	 cost	of	 the	 conventional	 is	 1 .	
Both	are	positive,	and	the	conventional	technology	is	cheaper	than	the	LCT	in	the	
first	period:	 11 < c .	The	second	period	marginal	cost	of	the	LCT	depends	on	 x ;	it	
is	denoted	 )(2 xc .	Learning‐by‐doing	is	represented	by	the	assumptions:		
	 	 0.0,,=(0) 22
2
2
2 


x
c
x
ccc 	 	 	 	 	 	 (1)	
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The	second	period	LCT	marginal	cost	decreases	with	respect	 to	the	 first	period	
quantity	of	LCT	plants,	and	this	effect	decreases	with	the	quantity	of	LCT	plants:	
learning‐by‐doing	is	more	important	for	the	first	plants	developed.	Furthermore,	
it	is	also	assumed	that	learning	effects	tend	to	vanish:		
	 	 0.=lim,and,=)(lim 22 x
ccxc
xx 


	 	 	 	 	 (2)	
	 The	 second	 period	 cost	 of	 a	 conventional	 plant	 is	  2 	 where	  	 is	 a	
random	 variable	 that	 represents	 the	 uncertainty	 surrounding	 CO2	 emissions	
prices.	 The	 expected	 value	 of	  	 is	 0 ,	 and	 2 	 is	 the	 expected	 cost	 of	 the	
conventional	technology,	which	is	assumed	to	be	lower	than	the	cost	of	LCT	if	no	
LCT	plants	are	built	in	the	first	period:	 c<2 .	The	random	parameter	 	is	either	
negative	 at	 the	 level	 l 	 with	 probability	  	 or	 positive	 	 at	 the	 level	 h 	 with	
probability	 1 .	 	 The	 parameter	  	 represents	 the	 state	 of	 the	 world,	 it	 is	
identified	 with	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 actual	 cost	 of	 the	 conventional	
technology	and	the	expected	one.		
	
It	is	important	to	note	that	the	cost	of	LCT	plants	decreases	with	respect	
to	 preceding	 investments	 and	 not	 with	 respect	 to	 current	 investments.	 This	
assumption	is	used	to	cast	the	temporal	dimension	of	learning‐by‐doing.	If	firms	
invest	 today,	 it	makes	 LCT	 plants	more	 competitive	 tomorrow.	 Learning	 gains	
cannot	 be	 immediately	 obtained	 by	 investing	 in	 LCT	 plants	 (a	 standard	
assumption	 in	most	models	 of	 learning‐by‐doing	 or	 knowledge	diffusion).	 This	
temporal	 aspect	 of	 learning‐by‐doing	 is	 at	 the	 root	 of	 the	 option	 value	 of	 first	
period	investments	in	the	LCTs.		
	
The	 costs	 functions	 should	 be	 addressed	 given	 the	 three	 following	
simplifications:	the	differences	in	cost	structures	(ratio	of	variable	to	sunk	costs)	
are	 not	 considered,	 the	 cost	 of	 a	 conventional	 plant	 in	 the	 first	 period	 is	 not	
random,	and	the	discount	rate	is	only	implicit.	First,	all	costs	are	complete	costs	
that	 encompass	 both	 investment	 costs	 and	 the	 sum	 of	 annual	 operation	 and	
maintenance	 fixed	 and	 variable	 costs,	 which	 are	 implicitly	 discounted.	 The	
variables	costs	are	accounted	 for	 in	 the	 technology	cost	of	 the	decision	period.	
Second,	the	first	period	cost	of	the	conventional	technology	is	modeled	as	certain	
while	 its	 variable	 component	 is	 related	 to	 the	 CO2	 price.	 Thus,	 1 	 should	 be	
considered	as	the	long	run	expected	marginal	cost	of	conventional	plants	in	the	
first	period.	By	not	 introducing	 the	uncertainty	 in	 the	 first	period	conventional	
costs,	it	is		implicitly	assumed	that	all	conventional	plants	built	in	the	first	period	
are	used	 in	 the	second	period.	This	means	 that	 the	CO2	price	 is	not	sufficiently	
large	to	justify	stopping	the	use	of	a	conventional	plant	to	replace	it	with	an	LCT	
plant.	Third,	no	discount	rate	is	explicitly	introduced	 ,	and	its	influence	will	not	
be	investigated	in	this	article;	however,	some	remarks	can	be	made.	An	increase	
in	 the	discount	rate	would	decrease	all	expected	costs	and,	presumably,	have	a	
greater	 effect	 on	 LCT	 costs	 than	 on	 conventional	 costs	 because	 LCTs	 are	
generally	more	capital	 intensive	than	conventional	technologies.	 In	addition,	an	
increase	 in	 the	 discount	 rate	 would	 also	 modify	 the	 random	 component	 and	
decrease	its	variance.	
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The	distribution	of	 	is	exogenous,	the	first	period	quantity	of	LCT	plants	
does	not	influence	the	distribution	and	the	value	of	the	CO 2 	prices.	The	implicit	
assumption	 is	 that	 the	 environmental	 damage	 is	 linear,	 so	 the	 second	 period	
optimal	price	of	emissions	is	neither	influenced	by	the	first	period	emissions	or	
the	 	 development	 of	 the	 LCT..This	 assumption	 is	 justified	 for	 a	 sector	 based	
analyzis	if	the	sector	under	consideration	is	relatively	small	compared	to	the	rest	
of	the	economy.		Furthermore,	uncertainty	is	resolved	through	time	and	the	cost	
to	acquire	information,	i.e.	the	cost	of	scientific	research,	is	not	modeled.	
	
2.2		Timing	and	option	value	
	
The	objective	of	the	regulator	is	to	minimize	the	cost	of	 1D 	and	 2D 	plants.	
The	aggregate	cost	in	a	state	 	is:		
	 	      222111 ),(min=),( xcDxDxcxC 	 	 	 (3)	
	To	understand	the	influence	of	information	discovery,	the	usual	methodology	of	
the	option	value	 literature	 is	used.	Two	situations	are	compared	 in	which	  	 is	
known	 or	 not	 known	 when	 the	 second	 period	 plants	 are	 built.	 In	 the	 the	
uninformed	 scenario	  	 is	 unknown	 when	 the	 second	 period	 technology	 is	
selected;	 the	 choice	 is	 based	 on	 the	 expected	 cost	 2 .	 This	 corresponds	 to	 the	
choice	 made	 when	 no	 information	 is	 obtained	 between	 the	 first	 and	 second	
period,	or	to	the	choice	made	by	a	regulator	that	does	not	anticipate	that	he	will	
acquire	that	information	(see	Lorenz	et	al.,	2012,	for	a	discussion).	It	means	that	
the	 regulator	 	 uses	 the	 expected	 CO2	 price	 to	 assess	 whether	 the	 LCT	will	 be	
further	developed	 in	 the	 future.	Given	 that	 the	 expected	value	 of	 	 is	 zero,	 the	
objective	is:2			
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (4)	
	
The	solution	to	this	problem	is	denoted	 0x .		
The	influence	of	information	is	analyzed	by	comparing	the	scenario	above	
with	 an	 informed	 scenario	 in	 which	 the	 regulator	 anticipates	 obtaining	
information	in	the	future.	Formally,	in	the	informed		scenario,	the	second	period	
technology	is	chosen	once	 	is	known.	The	timing	is:			
				1.		 x 	is	chosen	with	prior	belief	on	 ;		
				2.	 	 	 is	learned	and	either	LCT	or	conventional	technology	is	used	for	the	 2D 	
remaining	plants.		
In	this	case,	the	problem	is:		
	 	 E 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (5)	
	and	its	solution	is	denoted	as	 Lx .		
The	value	of	information	acquisition	for	any	 x 	is	the	difference:		
                                                 
2To	better	suit	the	option	value	literature,	we	could	have	made	explicit	the	choice	of	technology	
in	 the	 second	 period;	 for	 instance,	 with	 a	 variable	  convLCTz , 	 and	 a	 cost	 function	
),,( zx ,	the	uninformed	minimization	problem	would	have	been	 )],,([min , zxEzx  ,	while	
with	 information	 discovery,	 it	 would	 be	  ),,(minmin zxE zx  .	 Due	 to	 the	 linearity	 of	 our	
framework,	 the	 former	 is	 equivalent	 to	 equation	 (4)	 and	 the	 latter	 to	 (5),	 which	 simplify	
notations	and	exposition. 
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	 	   0.),(,0)(  xCExC 	 	 	 	 	 	 (6)	
In	the	next	section	the	optimal	first	period	choice	in	the	uninformed	scenario	
is	analyzed	before	considering	the	effect	of	 information	and	the	option	value	of	
LCT.	
	
 3		Optimal	investments	
3.1		Uninformed	scenario	
	
In	 this	 section,	 the	 optimal	 policy	 in	 the	 uninformed	 scenario,	 when	
information	arrival	is	not	anticipated,	is	analyzed.	Learning‐by‐doing	introduces	
a	particular	 form	of	spillovers	across	periods	 in	 the	production	process:	plants	
that	 are	 developed	 initially	 reduce	 the	 cost	 of	 following	 projects.	 The	 effect	 of	
first	period	LCT	plants	on	the	aggregated	expected	cost	(eq.	3)	with	 0= 	is:		
	 	  






otherwise)(
>)( if0
=
2
2
22
11 Dx
x
c
xc
c
x
C 
	 	 	
	 (7)	
	
The	 first	 term	 is	 the	 relative	 cost	 of	 an	 LCT	 plant	 as	 compared	 to	 the	
conventional	carbon	technology.	As	LCT	plants	replace	conventional	plants,	this	
is	the	direct‐‐first	period‐‐cost	of	an	LCT	plant.	The	second	term	is	the	effect	of	
LCT	plants	on	the	second	period	cost.	It	is	null	 if	LCT	plants	are	not	used	in	the	
long‐term	and	strictly	negative	otherwise	as	a	result	of	learning‐by‐doing.	
Figure	1	represents	the	aggregate	expected	cost	with	respect	to	the	quantity	of	
LCT	 plants	 built	 in	 the	 first	 period;	 it	 illustrates	 the	 non‐convexity	 due	 to	
learning‐by‐doing.	At	first,	with	few	LCT	plants	built,	the	total	cost	increases	with	
the	quantity	of	LCT	plants	because	they	are	not	competitive	in	the	long	term.	At	a	
point,	the	total	cost	may	decrease	due	to	learning‐by‐doing.		
	
	
	
	
Figure	1:	Expected	cost	with	respect	to	first	period	LCT	plants	in	the	uninformed	scenario	with	
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Figure	1	illustrates	that	a	determination	of	whether	LCT	plants	should	be	
developed	in	the	first	period	cannot	be	made	by	marginal	reasoning	but	requires	
the	comparison	of	aggregate	costs	with	and	without	LCT	development.	
The	 solution	 of	 marginal	 reasoning	 would	 be	 )( 2* Dx 	 in	 which	 	 is	 the	
quantity	that	minimizes	the	cost	 :	
	 	 	 		 	 (8)	
		is	the	optimal	quantity	of	first	period	LCT	plants	when	a	quantity	D	of	LCT	
plants	are	built	in	the	second	period.	This	quantity	is	either	 0 	or	the	solution	of	
the	equation:		
	 	 	  .= 2211 xx
cDc 
  		 	 	 	 	 (9)	
	
In	order	to	avoid	situations	in	which	all	first	period	plants	are	of	the	LCT	
type,	 because	 it	 seems	 unrealistic	 and	 can	 make	 the	 exposition	 rather	
cumbersome,	 a	 further	 assumption	 is	 necessary;	 the	 number	 of	 first	 period	
plants	should	be	sufficiently	large.	Thus,	in	the	rest	of	the	paper,	it	is	assume	that	
the	quantities	of	plants	 1D 	and	 2D 	satisfy:		
	 	 	   .<
2
11
1
2
D
cD
x
c 

 	 	
		 This	assumption	means	that	if	all	first	period	plants	were	LCT	plants,	the	
learning	 benefit	 (left‐hand	 side)	would	 be	 less	 than	 the	 cost	 (right‐hand	 side).	
This	ensures	that	the	optimal	quantities	of	LCT	 	and	 	plants	(eq.	4	and	eq.	5)	
are	strictly	less	than	 1D .	
	
Lemma	1	A	 strictly	positive	quantity	of	LCT	 is	developed	 in	 the	 first	period,	 i.e.	
0>0x ,	 if	and	only	 if	the	conventional	technology	cost	( 2 )	 is	strictly	 larger	 than	
2
~ 	where:		
	 	 	 			 	 														(10)	
		
A	 strictly	 positive	 quantity	 of	 LCT	 plants	 is	 developed	 if	 learning	 effects	 are	
sufficiently	important	to	compensate	for	the	loss	due	to	the	relatively	higher	cost	
of	the	LCT	in	the	first	period.	The	condition	 22 ~>  	stands	for	a	global	and	not	a	
marginal	comparison	of	costs.	Two	situations	in	which	marginal	reasoning	would	
be	misleading	can	arise	because	there	are	two	local	minimums	one	at	0	and	the	
other	 one	 at	 	 	 ,	 in	 both	 cases	 the	 necessary	marginal	 conditions	 to	 be	 a	
minimum	are	satisfied	but	 these	are	not	sufficient	given	 that	 the	expected	cost	
function	is	not	convex.		
	
	
3.2		Learning‐by‐doing	and	information.	
	
The	introduction	of	information	acquisition	modifies	the	marginal	benefit	
from	first	period	LCT	plants	because	the	choice	of	the	second‐period	technology	
is	 now	 contingent	 on	 the	 true	 cost	 of	 the	 conventional	 technology.	 If	 this	
technology	 turns	 out	 to	 be	 cheap	 ( l = ),	 the	 LCT	 might	 be	 useless	 and	 the	
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learning‐by‐doing	 effects	 are	 wasted.	 However,	 if	 the	 conventional	 technology	
turns	 out	 to	 be	 expensive	 ( h = ),	 the	 learning‐by‐doing	 effects	 are	 valuable.	
The	 former	effect,	 the	possibility	 of	 finding	 that	 the	LCT	 is	worthless,	 is	 at	 the	
root	 of	 the	 standard	 irreversibility	 effect,	 while	 the	 latter	 can	 justify	 an	 early	
development	 of	 LCT	 plants	 that	 would	 not	 have	 been	 completed	 without	
information	 anticipation.	 First	 period	 LCT	 plants	might	 be	more	 valuable	with	
information	because	they	increase	flexibility	by	decreasing	the	costs	of	following	
plants.	
	
Formally,	the	expected	cost	with	information	is:		
	    xcDxCE 1111=),(   	 (12)	
	  






otherwise.
 )(   if))((1
 )( if
22
222222
2222
Dc
xcDc
xcD
lhl
h


	
		 The	marginal	effect	of	first	period	LCT	on	the	aggregate	cost	is:		
	  














otherwise
 )(   if
 )( if0
=),(
2
2
222
2
2
22
11
x
cD
xc
x
cD
xc
c
x
xCE
lh
h


 	 (13)	
	
The	interesting	situation	is	the	intermediary	one	in	which	LCT	plants	are	
used	 in	 the	high	 carbon	 cost	 state	but	 are	not	 included	 in	 the	 low	 carbon	 cost	
state.	In	the	two	other	cases	expected	costs	with	information	are	equal	to	costs	
without	information.	Figure	(2)	depicts	the	two	costs	in	a	situation	where	there	
is	no	development	of	the	LCT	without	information	but	there	is	with	information.	
The	distance	between	the	two	curves	is	the	value	of	information.	
	
		
Figure	2:	Expected	cost	as	a	function	of	the	quantity	of	first	period	LCT	plants	in	the	informed	
(dotted	curve)	and	uninformed	(solid	curve)	scenario,	with	the	specification	 .	
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Proposition	1	If 	(cf.	eq.	10)there	 is	less	LCT	developped	with	 information	
than	without		
	 .0xxL  	
If	 22 ~  ,	LCT	is	not	developed	without	information,	i.e.	 0=0x ,	and	if		
	
x
cDc 
 (0)< 2211  	 (14)	
	  ,)(< 222 Dxcl   	(15)	
	   )()(> 2
2
11
222 DxD
cDxch 
   	 (16)	
	there	is	a	strictly	positive	quantity	of	LCT	plants	built	with	information:		
	 .=0> 0xx L 	
	
	
The	proposition	 sets	 conditions	under	which	 the	 classical	 irreversibility	
effect	 does	 or	 does	 not	 hold.	 For	 some	 range	of	 parameters,	 the	 irreversibility	
effect	 holds.	 If	 the	 LCT	 is	 developed	 without	 information,	 the	 anticipation	 of	
information	arrival	reduces	the	benefits	from	first	period	LCT	plants	because	the	
LCT	may	go	unused	if	the	conventional	technology	is	cheaper	than	expected.	In	
this	 case,	 it	 is	worth	waiting	 and	 postponing	 investment	 in	 the	 LCT.	However,	
Proposition	 1	 proves	 that	 for	 other	 ranges	 of	 parameters,	 the	 irreversibility	
effect	 is	 reversed,	 information	 acquisition	 can	 justify	 an	 early	 development	 of	
LCT.	 If	 2 	 is	 large,	 the	anticipation	of	 information	arrival	and	 the	possibility	of	
discovering	that	the	LCT	is	necessary	increase	the	value	of	first	period	plants	and	
can,	consequently,	justify	investments.	In	that	case,	consequent	cost	reduction	is	
sufficient	to	trigger	further	deployment	of	the	LCT	only	in	the	case	of	a	stringent	
CO2	 policy	 ( h = );	 it	 is	 not	 sufficient	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	 lax	 policy	 ( l = )	 A	
situation	in	which	it	is	found	(against	the	classicla	ireeversibility	effect)	that	the	
should	be	used	 can	only	 occur	 if	 the	LCT	 is	 not	 developped	 in	 the	uninformed	
scenario.	 Thus,	 the	 irreversibility	 effect	 is	 only	 reversed	 in	 the	 case	 in	 which	
there	 is	 no	 investment	 in	 LCT	 plants	 in	 the	 uniformed	 scenario.	 For	 this	 last	
situation	to	hold,	the	difference	between	the	two	possible	cost	 lh   	should	be	
sufficiently	important.	Note	that	if:		
	 	 	 	 ,22 hl cc   	
the	two	conditions	(15)	and	(16)	are	superfluous,	and	(14)	is	sufficient	to	ensure	
that	 0>Lx .	
	
The	misleading	nature	of	marginal	reasoning	is	 illustrated	by	Figure	(2);	
in	the	case	depicted,	the	expected	cost	without	information	(the	dashed	curve	in	
the	 figure)	 decreases	 at	 Lx ;	 thus,	 if	 the	 optimal	 policy	 0x 	 were	 an	 interior	
solution	of	 the	optimization	problem,	 it	would	be	 larger	 than	 Lx .	The	expected	
cost	without	 information	 is	 decreasing	 at	 Lx 	 because	 LCT	 is	more	 likely	 to	 be	
used	with	 information	 than	without	 it.	 It	 is	 therefore	 true	 that	 if	 Lx 	 has	 been	
already	built	 it	would	be	 rational	 to	 further	develop	 the	LCT	 technology	 in	 the	
first	period	to	 )( 2Dx .	
	
	
EPRG	WP	1215	
12 
3.3		Discussion	
	
The	 simplicity	 of	 the	 model	 could	 naturally	 be	 criticized	 for	 lack	 of	
realism.	Three	simplifying	assumptions	are	discussed:	(i)	the	number	of	periods	
used,	(ii)	the	state	distribution	and	(iii)	demand	elasticity.	
	
First,	 the	 use	 of	 a	 two‐periods	 framework	 is	 common	 in	 option	 value	
literature.	 In	 our	 case,	 one	 limit	 of	 this	 simplification	 is	 that	 the	 learning‐by‐
doing	associated	with	 the	 second	period	plants	 is	not	 considered.	 If	we	do	not	
invest	in	LCT	today,	learning‐by‐doing	benefits	could	still	be	obtained	from	later	
investment	after	information	acquisition.	The	assumption	that	investment	in	the	
first	period	reduce	the	cost,	thanks	to	the	learning	effect,	only	in	a	second	period	
could	 be	 justified	 by	 the	 large	 time‐span	 of	 construction	 and	 return	 on	
experience.	 This	 timespan	 is	 particularly	 important	 for	 complex	 technologies.	
Nevertheless	 to	 model	 an	 analysis	 with	 more	 periods	 that	 would	 take	 into	
account	 the	 successive	 learning‐by‐doing	 effects	 and	 scale	 economies	 in	 the	
equipment	 industries,	 it	 would	 require	 to	 specify	 the	 timing	 of	 information	
revelation	and	demand	growth	(see	Karp	and	Zhang,	2006).	This	would	raise	the	
following	questions:	When	and	in	which	information	set	should	the	LCT	policy	be	
launched?	Which	 scale	 the	 LCT	 deployment	 should	 have	 ideally	 ?	 A	 priori,	 the	
same	kind	of	effect	that	has	exhibited	in	the	present	analyzis	would	be	at	work	in	
any	 information	 set.	 	 The	 present	 framework	 could	 describe	 the	 particular	
situation	where,	 in	 the	 second	period,	 all	 information	 is	 obtained	 and	 demand	
stops	 increasing.	 It	 is	 relevant	 for	 addressing	 the	 current	 situation	 of	 the	
European	electricity	sector	because	it	is	at	an	intersection	between	the	need	for	
new	investments	and	high	uncertainty	concerning	future	CO 2 	regulation,	even	if	
all	uncertainties	would	not	be	resolved	in	the	ten	next	years.	If	a	third	period	is	
simply	 added	 while	 all	 uncertainties	 are	 resolved	 at	 the	 second	 period	 but	
demand	still	 grows	 in	 the	 third	one,	 the	second‐period	LCT	 investments	would	
be	more	valuable	because	of	 learning‐by‐doing.	 In	such	case,	 the	results	would	
still	hold	but	 the	 threshold	cost	 2~ 	would	be	smaller	and	 the	optimality	of	 the	
early	development	situation	less	likely.	
	
Second,	 concerning	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	 carbon	price,	 a	 continuum	of	
states	 of	 the	 world	 does	 not	 solve	 the	 issue	 of	 non‐convexity	 and	 marginal	
reasoning	would	still	be	limited	in	that	case.	With	a	more	general	distribution	of	
demand	state	our	results	would	not	be	significantly	modified,	and,	 the	effect	at	
stake	would	be	similar,	however,	more	painfully	exposed.	A	related	matter	is	that	
two	 extreme	 cases	 are	 compared	 here:	 without	 and	 with	 information	 and	 it	
would	be	possible	to	analyze	more	general	changes	in	the	distribution	of	demand	
states,	 as	 an	 increase	 in	 risk	 (Rothshild	 and	 Stiglitz,	 1970),	 on	 the	 optimal	
quantity	of	LCT	plants.	Such	an	analysis	would	lead	to	ambiguous	results	that	are	
similar	to	those	obtained	in	the	seminal	work	of	Rothshild	and	Stioglitz	(1971)	as	
well	as	 in	 the	more	recent,	and	more	closely	 related,	work	of	Baker	and	Shittu	
(2006).	 These	 ambiguities	 would	 be	 obtained	 by	 comparing	 interior	
equilibriums.	The	insight	of	the	present	work	is	not	the	mere	possibility	that	in	
some	 situations	 an	 increase	 in	 risk	 can	 imply	 an	 increase	 of	 an	 irreversible	
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investment,	a	result	that	 is	well‐known	since	the	work	of	Rothshild	and	Stiglitz	
(1971),	but	the	fact	that	an	increase	in	risk	can	move	the	global	optimum	from	a	
corner	(in	which	the	LCT	is	not	developped)	to	an	interior	equilibrium	and	that	
marginal	reasoning	could	be	misleading.	
	
Third,	in	the	framework,	the	quantity	of	plants	developed	in	each	period	
was	 considered	 to	 be	 exogenous	 i.e.,	 demands	 were	 assumed	 to	 be	 price	
inelastic.	 With	 this	 assumption,	 the	 non‐convexity	 introduced	 by	 learning‐by‐
doing	 was	 clear	 and	 easily	 handled.	 With	 elastic	 demands,	 there	 are	 more	
variables	to	be	chosen	in	the	first	period:	not	only	the	quantity	of	LCT	plants	but	
also	the	total	quantity	of	plants.	More	precisely,	 if	 the	social	surplus	created	by	
plants	in	period	 1,2=t 	is	denoted	by	 tS ,	the	social	welfare	in	a	state	 	would	be		
	 	 (17)	
and	 	would	be	chosen	with	or	without	information.	In	a	state	 	it	would	solve	
the	 first	 order	 condition	 The	 non	 convexity	
that	 was	 exposed	 in	 the	 	 simple	 model	 is	 also	 present	 in	 such	 a	 model;	 it	 is	
related	to	the	need	to	invest	sufficiently	in	LCT	plants	to	make	them	competitive.	
The	 effect	 stressed	 with	 the	 simpler	 version	 would	 still	 hold	 and	 explain	 the	
possibility	of	 situations	 in	which	 the	LCT	 is	not	developed	without	uncertainty	
but	is	developed	with	uncertainty.	However,	in	the	other	case,	where	the	LCT	is	
developed	without	uncertainty,	 the	comparison	 is	 less	straightforward	because	
of	 a	 cross	 effect.	With	 information,	 the	 total	 quantity	 of	 first	 period	 plants	 1D 	
should	 be	 smaller	 (as	 the	 irreversibility	 effect	 suggests),	 and	 this	 reduction	
induces	more	 plants	 to	 be	 built	 in	 the	 second	 period	 	 and	 this	 increase	 has	 a	
positive	 effect	 on	 the	marginal	 value	 of	 LCT	 plants.	 The	 substitution	 between	
first	 and	 second	 periods	 plants	 would	 increase	 the	 incentive	 to	 invest	 in	 LCT	
today.	 Because	 of	 this	 cross	 effect	 the	 model	 is	 hardly	 solvable	 and	 the	
comparison	 between	 the	 local	 optima	 difficult.	 However,	 even	 though	 a	 full	
analytical	analyzis	is	not	provided	this	issue	is	partly	adressed	in	the	numerical	
illustration	that	follows.	
	 	
 4.	A	numerical	illustration		
	
To	 complete	 the	 formal	 analyzis	 a	 numerical	 illustration	 is	 performed.	
This	 illustration	 is	used	to	partly	adress	one	of	 the	 limitations	mentionned,	 the	
inelasticity	 of	 demand,	 and	 to	 consider	 the	 effect	 of	 some	 key	parameters:	 the	
learning	rate,	 the	expected	CO2	price	and	volatility.	The	 illustration	 is	based	on	
the	case	of	coal	power	plants	and	Carbon	Capture	and	Storage	(CCS).	
	
The	 two	 periods	 are	 2015‐2030	 for	 t=1,	 and	 2030	 and	 beyond	 for	 t=2.	
Two	 yearly	 demand	 functions	 are	 calibrated	 and	 two	 surplus	 	 and	
	 are	 obtained	 from	 these	 demands	with	 a	 proper	 discounting.	 The	
welfare	function	in	a	state	 	is	 given	by	eq.	(17).	In	the	uninformed	
scenario	the	objective	is		
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And	in	the	informed	one		
.	
	
4.1.	Parameters	choice	
	
The	 conventional	 technology	 is	 pulverized	 coal	 conbustion	 power	
generation	without	CO2	capture	and	the	LCT	is	the	same	technology	with	a	post‐
conbustion	 capture	 equipment.	 The	 calibration	 of	 costs	 is	 presnted	 in	 Table	 1.	
These	assumptions	are	from	MIT	(2007).	Each	cost	is	composed	of	an	investment	
part,	 that	 represents	 the	 cost	 to	 build	 the	 capacity	 and	 a	 variable	 part	 that	 is	
composed	of	 three	 terms:	operation	and	maintenance	 costs,	 fuel	 costs	and	CO2	
cost.	All	costs	are	normalized	and	expressed	in	$/kW.	Concerning	the	first‐period	
conventional	cost	 	the	variable	part	is	it	self	decomposed	into	two	
parts	because	it	is	modified	by	the	CO2	price	in	the	second	period.		
	
The	expected	CO2	price	in	2030	is	40$/t	CO2.	The	distribution	is	assumed	
to	 be	 symmetric,	 the	 CO2	 price	 is	 either	 50$/t	 (in	 )	 or	 30$/t	 (in	 )	 with	
probability	 0.5	 (	 ).	 The	 probability	 of	 being	 in	 either	 states	 is	
kept	 constant	 at	 0.5.	 Therefore,	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	 prices	 of	 CO2	 is	
characterized	by	 its	mean	and	 the	difference	between	 the	 two	CO2	prices.	This	
difference	is	denoted	 ,	it	is	20$/t	in	the	central	set	of	assumptions.	
	
	
	
	 Conventional LCT CO2
Investment	
($/kW)	
1300	 3000 E[pCO2]	($/t) 40$/t	
	O&M	
($/kW)	
400	 1150 pCO2(θh)	($/t) 50$/t	
Fuel	($/kW)	 800	 850 pCO2(θl)	($/t) 30$/t	
CO2@40$/t	 1700	 0 π 0.5	
	
Table	1:	assumptions	about	costs.	
Concerning	the	second	period	LCT	cost,	it	is	modeled	by	
	 .	
The	secondt	 term	represents	 the	part	of	 the	cost	 that	 is	subject	 to	 learning‐by‐
doing	 effects.	 The	 parameter	 l 	 is	 the	 elasticity	 of	 this	 term	 with	 respect	 to	
cumulative	 investment.	 The	 learning	 rate	 is	 l 21 ,	 that	 is,	 the	 relative	 cost	
reduction	 for	 each	 doubling	 of	 capacity.	 According	 to	 MacDonald	 and	
Schrattenholzer	 (2001)	 the	average	 learning	rate	 is	15%	 for	 the	energy	sector.	
This	 estimated	 is	 used	 together	 with	 the	 assumption	 that	 	 the	 floor	 cost	 	 is	
slightly	larger	than	the	cost	of	a	conventional	coal	plant	(without	emissions	cost),	
it	is	set	at	2600	$/kW.	is	.		
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Finally,	concerning	the	demand,	in	each	period	t=1,2	the	yearly	demand	is	
represented	 by	 a	 linear	 price	 function	 DbaDp ttt )( ,	 the	 corresponding	
yearly	consumer	surplus	 is	 DDba tt )5.0(  .	These	surplus	are	discounted	to	get	
	 and	 	by	 	 and	 	 respectively.	The	 inverse	price	
function	is	calibrated	so	as	to	have	a	market	of	300GW	initially	for	an	electricity	
price	of	50$/MWh	and	an	elasticity	of	 ‐0.7	(see	the	survey	of	Espey	and	Espey,	
2004).	 In	 the	 second	period	 the	market	 is	 twice	 larger	 than	 in	 the	 first	period.	
This	growth	of	the	market	can	be	originated	either	from	an	increase	of	demand	
or	 a	 reduction	 of	 avalaible	 capacity.	 A	 doubling	 of	 the	demand	 in	 fifteen	 years	
correspond	 to	 a	 yearly	 growth	 rate	 	 of	 5%,	which	 is	 an	 intermediary	 situation	
between	OECD	countries	and	the	BRICs.	The	coefficients	are		
	
	and	 .	
	
	
4.2.	Results	
	
	
First,	 the	comparison	of	welfare	 is	done	 in	Figure	3.	As	could	be	seen	 in	
Figure	3a,	with	 the	central	set	of	assumptions,	no	CCS	plants	should	be	built	 in	
the	uninformed	scenario	whereas	approximately	6	plants	should	be	built	 in	the	
informed	scenario.	However,	with	an	expected	CO2	price	of	45$/t	as	in	Figure	3b,	
the	picture	is	different	and	a	positive	amount	of	CCS	should	be	invested	in	both	
scenarios	 and	more	 in	 the	 uninformed	 than	 in	 the	 informed	 one.	 The	 optimal	
policies	 and	 the	 comparison	of	 these	policies	 seems	 to	be	highly	 sensitive	 in	 a	
neighborhood	of	the	central	set	of	assumptions.	
	
3a	EpCO2=40$/t	 3b	EpCO2=45$/t	
Figure	3:	Expected	Welfare	in	the	informed	(plain	line)	and	the	uninformed	scenario	(dashed	Line)	
as	a	function	of	the	number	of	CCS	plants.	
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The	effect	of	 the	 learning	 rate	 is	 of	particular	 significance	as	 it	 is	 at	 the	
root	of	the	option	value	created	by	LCT	develoment.	The	comparison	of	the	two	
scenarios	is	completed	in	Figure	4.	In	Figure	4,	for	small	learning	rates	(region	A)	
there	is	no	LCT	plants	developed	in	the	first	period	in	both	scenarios;	for	slightly	
larger	values	(region	B),	there	are	some	plants	developed	with	information	and	
no	 plants	 developed	 without	 information;	 for	 large	 learning	 rates	 (region	 C)	
there	 are	 plants	 developed	 with	 and	 without	 information	 and	 both	 quantities	
eventually	coincide	(region	D).	Thus,	for	large	learning	rates	(regions	C	and	D)	it	
is	worth	developing	LCT	in	any	cases	and	the	possibility	of	learning	that	the	LCT	
is	 not	 necessary	 calls	 for	 a	 prudential	 development	 of	 the	 technology	 in	 the	
informed	 scenario.	 It	 is	 for	 intermediary	 learning	 rates	 (region	 B)	 that	 future	
information	 can	 justify	 an	 early	 development	 of	 LCT.	 In	 that	 case,	 the	 cost	
reduction	is	sufficient	to	trigger	further	deployment	of	the	LCT	only	in	the	case	of	
a	 stringent	 CO 2 	 policy	 ( h = );	 it	 is	 not	 sufficient	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	 lax	 policy	
( l = ).	
	
	
	
Figure	4:	Optimal	quantity	of	LCT	plants	and	learning	rate,	in	the	informed	scenario	(plain	line)	and	
the	uninformed	scenario	(dashed	line).	
	
	
On	Figure	4	the	sets	B	and	C	in	which	the	two	optimal	policies	differ	are	
relatively	 small,	 even	 though	 they	 concern	 relevant	 values	of	 learning	 rates.	 In	
Figure	5,	 the	optimal	policies	with	the	two	scenarios	are	depicted	with	a	wider	
distribution	of	CO2	prices.	In	Figure	5,	the	price	of	CO2	is	either	60$/t	or	20$/t.	
The	distinction	between	the	two	scenarios	is	amplified	and	the	sets	in	which	the	
two	 scenarios	 differ	 are	 enlarged	 by	 an	 increase	 of	 the	 variance	 of	 the	
distribution	of	the	CO2	price.		
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Figure	5:	Optimal	quantity	of	LCT	plants	and	learning	rate,	in	the	informed	scenario	(plain	line)	and	
the	uninformed	scenario	(dashed	line),	with	 	and	 	
	
	
A	similar	analysis	can	be	performed	regarding	the	expected	CO2	price.	In	
Figure	(6),	the	two	optimal	policies	are	depicted	with	two	different	variances	of	
the	CO2	prices	distribution.	In	Figure	6a,	the	central	assumption	 	
is	used	and	in	Figure	6b	the	distribution	is	wider	with		 .	The	same	
patern	as	previously	 is	observed.	 In	both	cases,	as	 the	CO2	price	 increases	 four	
situations	 successively	 occurs.	 For	 small	 price	 (region	 A)	 the	 LCT	 is	 not	
developped	in	neither	scenarios.	For	intermediary	value	it	is	only	developped	in	
the	informed	scenario	(region	B)	then	in	both	with	a	larger	development	in	the	
uninformed	one	(region	C).	Eventually,	both	policies	coincide	for	large	CO2	prices	
(region	D).	The	intermediary	regions	B	and	C,	in	which	the	two	policies	differ,	are	
enlarged	when	the	distribution	of	the	CO2	price	is	increased.		
	
	
Figure6a	 	 Figure	6b	 	
Figure	6:	Optimal	quantities	of	LCT	plants	with	respect	to	the	expected	CO2	price	in	the	informed	
(plain	line)	and	uninformed	(dashed	line)	scenarios.	With	two	amplitude	of	variations.	
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 5		Conclusion	
	
The	aim	of	 the	present	work	was	 to	 solve	 an	apparent	 contradiction	 in	 the	
literature	 and	 in	 intuitive	 thinking	 on	 investments	 in	 LCTs	 in	 situations	 of	
uncertainty	 on	 the	 future	 carbon	 price:	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 these	 policies	 open	
options,	and	on	the	other	hand,	uncertainty	usually	calls	 for	careful	 investment	
policies.	 A	 simple	 analytical	model	was	 used	 to	 resolve	 this	 contradiction.	 The	
analysis	 showed	how	the	anticipation	of	 information	acquisition	 influences	 the	
two	decisions:	the	choice	to	launch	an	LCT	policy	and	the	choice	of	its	size.	The	
perspective	to	acquire	information	increases	the	incentive	to	launch	a	LCT	policy,	
but	it	also	calls	for	a	reduction	of	 its	size.	Therefore,	 if	the	decision	maker	does	
not	invest	when	he	ignores	future	information	discovery,	he	could	be	incited	to	
do	 so	 when	 anticipating	 the	 future	 revelation	 of	 information;	 but,	 if	 he	 does	
implement	an	LCT	policy	when	ignoring	information	discovery	he	should	have	to	
reduce	 it	 when	 anticipating	 information	 arrival.	 The	 key	 to	 this	 result	 is	 the	
possible	 move	 from	 a	 corner	 equilibrium	 to	 an	 interior	 equilibrium	 when	
information	arrival	is	anticipated.		
	
An	essential	feature	of	the	model	is	the	existence	of	multiple	local	optima.	
This	 multiplicity	 is	 related	 to	 learning‐by‐doing,	 and	 more	 generally	 to	
endogeneous	technical	change.	The	initial	investment	in	a	technology	constitutes	
a	 pure	 loss	 until	 the	 technology	 becomes	 competitive.	 It	 is	 only	 once	 this	
competitivity	 threshold	 is	 reached	 that	 a	 marginal	 investment	 could	 increase	
welfare.		A	numerical	illustration	was	done	to	extend	the	analyzis	to	a	framework	
with	 a	welfare	 function	 and	 to	 consider	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 learning	 rate	 and	 the	
distribution	of	the	CO2	price.			
	
The	model	does	not,	in	itself,	identify	a	justification	for	policy	intervention	
toward	 LCTs.	 Such	 a	 policy	 is	 	 justified	 if	 there	 are	 spillovers	 effects	 from	one	
firm	to	another.	If	this	is	the	case,	two	important	lessons	could	be	deduced.		
	
A	first	lesson	is	related	to	the	non	monotonicity	of	marginal	welfare	with	
respect	to	the	investment	in	LCT.	Governements	witnessing	the	financial	costs	of	
the	 support	 to	 renewable	 energies	 are	 contemplating	 this	 `non‐convexity’’,	 a	
support	policy	should	be	sufficiently	important	in	order	to	ensure	that	LCTs	are	
competitive.	These	policies	constitute	a	bet;	whether	the	cost	to	subsidize	LCTs	
today	is	worth	will	depend	on	their	relative	cost	tomorrow.	Many	uncertainties	
surround	these	relative	costs	among	which	the	uncertainty	of	the	future	price	of	
greenhouse	 gas	 emissions.	 The	 terms	 of	 this	 bet	 should	 be	 acknowledged.	 A	
support	 to	 LCT	 opens	 an	 option	 to	 face	 high	 carbon	 price	 and	 the	 size	 of	 this	
support	 should	 integrate	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	 carbon	 price	 be	 lower	 than	
expected.		
	
The	 second	 lesson	 is	 with	 respect	 to	 LCT	 policies	 that	 are	 decided	 by	
ignoring	uncertainty	and	considering	an	expected	carbon	price.	It	is	important	to	
stress	 that	 the	 anticipation	 of	 information	 arrival	 does	 not	 constitute	 an	
argument	 to	 stop	 these	 policies	 but	 only	 to	 downsize	 them.	 The	move	 from	 a	
corner	optimum	with	no	support	 to	LCT	 to	an	 interior	optimum	with	a	strictly	
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positive	 support	 arise	 when	 information	 is	 anticipated	 and	 not	 the	 other	 way	
around.		
	
Several	limits	of	the	model	have	also	important	consequences	in	terms	of	
policy,	 two	 of	 them	 are	 worth	 further	 investigations.	 First,	 the	 uncertainty	
surrounding	 the	 carbon	 price	 was	 considered	 exogeneous.	 It	 is	 important	 to	
recognize	 that	 this	 uncertainty	 could	 be	 reduced	 by	 investing	 in	 research	 and	
international	cooperation.	It	would	be	interesting	to	analyze	whether	investment	
in	 scientific	 research	 on	 climatic	 change	 is	 a	 substitue	 or	 a	 complement	 to	
investment	 in	 technological	 options.	 Second,	 the	 analyzis	 considers	 only	 one	
general	LCT	whereas	an	important	issue	is	the	choice	of	a	portfolio	of	LCTs.	To	
analyze	 this	 issue	 would	 require	 to	 consider	 the	 uncertainties	 surrounding	
learning	curves	which	was	ignored	in	the	present	article.		
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 Appendix	
	
Proof	of	Lemma	1	
	
The	 application	 2211 )()(: Dxcxcx   	 is	 strictly	 convex	 and	 minimized	 at	
)( 2Dx
 .	
The	cost	 ,0)(xC 	is:		
	 
 
otherwise)(
>)(if)(
=,0)( 22221111 x
xcDxc
DxC 
 	 (A1)	
	As	 c<2 	(by	assumption)	 2211=(0,0) DDC   .	 ,0)(xC 	is	minimized	either	at	 0 	
or	 )( 2Dx 	(possibly	at	both);	in	the	latter	case,	if	 0>)( 2Dx 	then	 222 <))(( Dxc  	
and	 )()(=,0)( 111   xDcxC  .	 With	 these	 preliminaries	 we	 can	 prove	 the	
equivalence	stated.	
()	 If	 0>0x ,	 then	 )(= 20 Dxx  	 and	 0>)( 2Dx ,	 so	 )(=,0)( 11   xDxC  .	
Replacing	both	members	of	the	inequality	 (0,0)<,0)( CxC  	by	their	expressions	
(from	 (A1)	 and	 above	 preliminaries)	 implies	 )(>22 xD  	 and	 dividing	 both	
sides	by	 2D 	gives	 22 ~>  .	
()	 If	 22 ~>  ,	 then	 )(> 22 xc 	 and	 0>)( 2Dx 	 (because	 c<2 );	 therefore,	
)(=,0)( 11
  xDxC  	 and	 the	 inequality	 22 ~>  	 implies	 (0,0)<,0)( CxC  	 (by	
multiplying	both	sides	by	 2D 	and	adding	 11D ).				
	
Proof	of	proposition	1	
	
Few	preliminaries	are	necessary.	
First,	 the	 function	 )(Dx 	 is	 strictly	 increasing,	 this	 can	 be	 shown	 by	
derivating	equation	(9)	with	respect	to	D 	and	using	the	fact	that	 2c 	is	convex	(cf	
eq.	1).	
Second,	 	 Lx 	 is	either	 0 ,	 )( 2Dx  	or	 )( 2Dx .	 Lx 	 is	defined	as	the	smallest	
argmin	 of	 the	 expected	 cost	 given	 by	 (12).	 The	 expected	 cost	 is	 twice	
differentiable	by	parts;	if	it	is	differentiable	at	 Lx 	its	derivative	is	null	and	 Lx 	is	
either	 )( 2Dx  	or	 )( 2Dx .	There	are	three	points	where	the	expected	cost	is	not	
differentiable	 :	 0 ,	 )( 212 lc   	 and	 )( 212 hc   .	 Let	us	 show	 that	 if	 Lx 	 is	one	of	
these	points	then	it	is	0 :	
‐	 Lx 	cannot	be	 )( 212 lc   	because	expected	cost	are	larger	at	this	point	
than	at	0 ;	
‐	if	 )(= 212 hL cx   	then	 LxDx  )( 	(because	 ,0)]([ xCE 	is	decreasing	to	
the	 left	of	 Lx )	and	 )( 2DxxL  	 (because	 )],([ xCE 	 is	 increasing	 to	 the	right	of	
Lx ),	 so	 )()( 22 DxDx   ,	 a	 contradiction	 (because	 	 is	 increasing	 in	 D	 and	
)	
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The	proposition	can	now	be	prooved	
 	 If	 22 ~>  ,	 the	 LCT	 is	 developed	 without	 information	 and	
0>)(= 2
0 Dxx  .	 With	 information,	 the	 expected	 cost	  ),( xCE 	 is	 minimized	
either	at	 0 ,  2Dx  	or	  2Dx 	all	of	which	are	smaller	or	equal	 than	  2Dx 	 so	
0xxL  .	
 	 Otherwise,	 if	 22 ~<  ,	 the	 LCT	 is	 not	 developed	 without	 information:	
0=0x .	Condition	(14)	implies	that	   0>2Dx  .	Inequalities	(15)	and	(16)	ensure	
that	  2Dx  	 locally	minimizes	  ),( xCE 	 because	   ,<)(< 2222 hl Dxc    	
and	 0>)( 2Dx  	 so	   0=/)),(( 2 xDxCE    .	 And	 finally	 (16)	 implies	 that	   )(0,<)),(( 2  CEDxCE  				
	
	
	
	
	
	
